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Abstract 
There is a growing body of evidence in the literature suggesting that the financial healh of a finn is likely to 
affect its investment behavior. This sort of capital market imperfection is often attributed to information 
problems that typically arise when deht and equity are diffusely held and no individual investor has an incentive 
to monitor the firm. We find that the neoclassical il1\'estll1ent model cannot be rejected for a sample of Spanish 
finns with a close bank relationship while it is r~iected for the subsample made up with the remaining firms. 
An augmented model incorporating horrowing constraints yields the opposite results. These results suggest that 
banks may play a role in alleviating capital market imperfectios in Spain. A second finding is that the effects 
of borrowing constraints in the augmented model vary only with the firm's cash now, but not with the asset 
liquidity or the tirn:'s financial health. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a growing body of evidence in the literature suggesting that the financial health of a 
firm is likely to affect its investment behavior. This sort of capital market imperfection is often 
attributed to information problems that typically arise when debt and equity are diffusely held 
and no individual investor has an incentive to monitor the firm. The purpose of this paper 
is to test the hypothesis that banks can compensate for capital market imperfections due to 
asymmetric information. 
Most of the available evidence (e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Roe, 1994; among others) on 
the role of banks as monitors comes from the US and Japan. Firms in these countries provide 
good examples of extreme cases of corporate governance. US firms tend to rely on anonymous 
investors more heavily than firms in other countries1. Constraints imposed by regulatory barriers 
(Glass-Steagall Banking Act) imply that the banks cannot exercise close monitoring and, indeed, 
the objective of such legislation is that the banks should not have a significant influence over a 
client firm's decisions. In the case of Japanese firms the main control over managers often comes 
not from large shareholders, but from the so-called "main bank" , which is simultaneously a large 
shareholder and the principal lender. In any event, both the US and Japan are very developed 
countries with large, liquid and developed capital markets2 . The case of Spain is interesting 
because it is an intermediate case between these two countries. 
1.1 The role of banks as monitors 
A number of reasons have been proposed to support the view that firms with a close bank 
relationship are more likely to avoid or mitigate information problems that typically arise when 
debt and equity are diffusely held and no individual investor has an incentive to monitor the 
firm. Authors such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that incentive problems raise the cost of 
external finance. Outside financing dilutes management's ownership stake, thereby exacerbating 
1 Among financial institutions it is only US insurance firms and pension and mutual funds which are com-
paratively important shareholders; in particular, banks' holdings are especially small (0.3 per cent in 1995). By 
contrast, in Japan the ownership of exchange-listed firms by banks is very important (26.7 per cent in 1995). 
2In other OECD member countries such as Germany (OECD 1995b, Cable 1985), banks also seem to have 
traditionally played a greater monitoring rule. 
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incentive problems that arise when managers control the firm, but do not own it. 
Supporters of the hypothesis that banks can compensate for capital market imperfections 
caused by asymmetric information, point out the innate advantage that bank-based monitoring 
has in reducing the information problem. Diamond (1984), among others (see also Broecker, 
1990 and Mayer, 1996), argues that banks serve as corporate monitors which bear the costs 
of becoming informed about their client firms and ensure that these make efficient business 
decisions. 
In principle, banks have the same incentive to monitor concentrated claims as other stake-
holders. However, various arguments have been given to support the hypothesis that banks are 
better monitors than other stakeholders. Firstly, by lending short term, the borrower is forced 
to come back regularly to the banks for funds, whereas equity never has to be repaid. Secondly, 
the incentive to monitor is enhanced to the extent that, because intermediated loans are less 
standardized than other debt, they are less liquid and likely to be held longer (Prowse, 1994). 
It has been also argued, that banks are, to a large extent, concerned only with default risk, 
implying that their interests may diverge from those of shareholders. 
Hoshi et al. (1996) and James and Wier (1987) are empirical works that find support for the 
hypothesis that the banks can reduce the information problems. Hoshi et al. use the forward-
looking information in Tobin's q, whilst J ames and \Vier document a more positive share price 
response for firms that announce that they have borrowed money from a bank than for firms 
that issue bonds. J ames and \Vier interpret this finding as evidence that banks exercise the 
monitoring function, while public bondholders do not. Although these results are consistent 
with our findings, there is clearly more work to be done on how banks affect firms' real business 
decisions. 
1.2 Spanish Financial Markets 
Spain has a more mixed system of corporate governance than the US and Japan, that is, un-
like US banks, Spanish banks hold large stakes in some sectors3 but their role in disciplining 
management and monitoring performance does not seem to be as important as it is in Japan 
3For instance the electricity and telecommunications sectors. 
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or Germany. The Spanish financial system may be seen as a hybrid model, lying somewhere 
between the Japanese and German models, on the one hand, and the US model on the other. 
Furthermore, the Spanish capital market is somewhat less developed than in these other 
countries. Thus, it may be argued that the existence of capital market imperfections is more 
plausible in this case. Financial markets in Spain are not yet fully developed, in the sense that 
most firms cannot get funds through bond and share issues. Obtaining bank loans is, in practice, 
the only source of external finance for many firms. The flow of funds to the firms quoted on the 
Stock Market is very small as compared to debt finance (see Berges et al., 1989). The share and 
debt markets are less developed than in countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom. 
The financial institutions are the main source of financial resources for firms (as in Germany 
and Japan), with the banks being the principal offerent of credit for the firm. According to 
Garcia Cestona (1996) and OECD data, Spanish firms have relied on banks as the main source 
of external finance for the period 1983-1992. 
The ownership structure of the sample of Spanish firms is similar to the structure found in 
many European countries, in the sense that the separation of ownership and management is 
not as radical as in the US. This feature means than the separation of ownership from control 
in the firm is not likely to create important governance problems, because the control group 
can exercise a close vigilance over the managers' behavior and mitigate the agency problem. 
Galvez and Salas (1995) have shown that the ownership structure and control of Spanish firms 
is similar to the European structure, with share ownership being very concentrated. In the light 
of this, the discussion in Spain should not be so much on the implication of a separation between 
ownership and control derived from limited shareholder concentration, but on the implications 
for efficiency of the nature of the control group, in our case, the banks 4. These authors observed 
a predominance of the group holding and/ or financial corporation as the control group, although 
a notable family and individual firm presence was still maintained. 
4Galvez and Salas (1992) found that, in 1990, the principal shareholder in the quoted Spanish firms was a 
national firm in 27 percent of the cases, a family or individual in 26.1 percent, a banking entity in 25.1 percent, 
a foreign firm in 17.4 percent, and the public sector in 2.2 percent of the firms. 
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1.3 Methodology 
All models that assume some sort of information problem in the capital market conclude that 
more liquid firms should invest more. These models also predict that liquidity is irrelevant 
when there are no information problems. These predictions have led to authors such as Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) to adopt the following methodology. Firms are divided into two 
groups according to their a priori beliefs about whether a firm faces information problems in the 
capital market. Then the null hypothesis that liquidity does not affect investment behavior is 
tested for each group of firms. Following this line, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1996) suggest 
using the forward-looking information in Tobin's q, the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the replacement cost of its assets, to finally distinguish constrained firms from unconstrained 
ones. The theory predicts that, if liquidity constraints are unimportant, Tobin's q should be the 
only determinant of investment. They examine two sets of Japanese firms according to whether 
they have close financial ties with a main bank or not and they find that the firms with weaker 
links to a main bank presumably face greater problems raising capital. 
Tobin's q has some well known problems. The marginal q is not directly observable, and 
there are concerns that observed stock market valuations may not accord with the predictions 
of the efficient markets hypothesis (due either to irrational behavior or to the very problems 
of asymmetric information stressed in alternative models). These problems can be avoided by 
using an estimation strategy developed by Whited (1992) and based on the Euler equation re-
presentation of firms' investment decisions. The starting point is a comparison of the investment 
behavior of one set of firms for which the neoclassical model is assumed to hold, with the in-
vestment behavior of another set for \vhich "financial constraints" are assumed to be important. 
U sing this approach we construct two samples based on the percentage of firm's shares owned 
by a bank. Firms with a close bank relationship are assumed, a priori, to be more likely to face 




This paper shows some evidence on the existence of financial constraints for those firms without 
a close bank relationship from a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms quoted in the period 
1991-1994. For the rest of the sample the neoclassical investment model is not rejected. Using 
firm-level panel data, the Euler equation for investment fits well for firms with a close bank rela-
tionship or what amounts to the same thing, the Euler equation will be observationally equivalent 
to the unconstrained Euler equation obtained under the assumption of perfect financial markets. 
However, the Euler equations for the rest of the firms (those without a close relationship) will 
differ from the unconstrained Euler equation; that is, the orthogonality conditions implied by 
the standard model are decisively rejected for firms without a close bank relationship. 
In trying to further understand this finding, we examine the particular type of financing 
constraint that the firms face. We find that the effects of borrowing constraints in our extended 
model (constrained Euler equation) vary only with firms' individual fortunes (cash flows), but 
not with the firm's financial health, that is, variables that measure the firm's lack of collateral and 
the likelihood of financial distress. The recent literature5 emphasizes the spread between risky 
and default-risk-free interest rates as a measure of the tightness of overall borrowing conditions. 
Thus, we parameterize borrowing constraints so that both, a firm's own cash flow and these 
spreads, may affect the extent to which the constraints are binding. It is found that, as expected, 
a greater availability of internal finance (cash flow) reduces the impact of financial constraints 
on investment. However, the financial health of the firm does not seem to affect the impact 
of the constraint on investment. The Spanish evidence shows how the financially constrained 
firms' investment behavior seems to be affected by their financial structure (debt, liquidity of 
assets ... )6. 
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we describe the institutional 
SSee Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap (1991) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) for further discussion of 
the information content of the spread. 
6Estrada y Valles (1995) obtain an alternative model of investment, where the credit offer depends not only on 
the level of debt, but also on the level of the firm's liquid assets. This finding differs from that of Alonso-Borrego 
(1994), who accepts the Bond and Meguir model only for the Spanish dividend-paying firm, and also finds that 
these firms have a negative external financial premium. 
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features of Spanish corporate finance that enable us to analyze the effects of information problems 
on investment. Section 3 derives an investment model based on the Euler equation corresponding 
to firms' intertemporal optimization problems for capital accumulation. In the presence of 
financial constraints, the Euler equation contains testable implications for alternative models. 
In Section 4, we describe the econometric specifications necessary to obtain the investment 
equations to be estimated. The data and our empirical tests are reported in Section 5. Section 
6 concludes the paper with a review of the results we have obtained. 
2 A neoclassical investment model 
In this section we present two dynamic investment models. The first is a standard neoclassical 
investment model that assumes perfect capital markets. The Euler equation corresponding to 
the firms' intertemporal optimization problems for capital accumulation yields an investment 
equation representing investment behavior as a function of only non financial variables. Secondly, 
we modify the model to account for the presence of financial constraints and we derive a new 
set of investment equations in which financial variables may affect investment. 
2.1 A neoclassical investment model with perfect capital markets 
Let's consider first a neoclassical environment in which all agents are risk neutraf, managers 
act on behalf of the shareholders and aim to maximize the value of their firms. Because of 
the well known Modigliani and Miller results we do no explicitly consider the issue for new 
shares. All new investment is financed through retained earnings and/or debt. The model is of 
partial equilibrium, in the sense that the behavior of the financial sector is taken as exogenous. 
Additionally, at any time t, all present variables are known to the firm with certainty, although 
all future variables are stochastic. Finally, the firms are assumed to have rational expectations. 
Each firm maximizes the present value of the current and future internal resources (I Rt), 
7""e suppose that the possible relation between finance and investment does not necessarily mean risk aversion 
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00 
Vt(Kt-1) = Et ~j3t+sIRt+s, (1) 
s=o 
where f3t+s is the discount factor between t and t + s, (that is f3t+s = I R~=l (1 + T t+n) -1 )8. The 
firm maximizes equation (1) subject to two constraints. The first is of a financial nature, where 
the resources generated by the company are devoted to the payment of the contracted debt in 
the previous period, and the other resources can be distributed as dividends or become part of 
the firms' equity. That is, internal resources cannot be negative, 
(2) 
The technological restriction is the capital stock accounting identity, 
Kt = It + (1 - 0)Kt- 1 (3) 
where Kt is the capital stock of the firm at the end of time t, It, is its investment at time t, 
and 0 is the constant rate of economic depreciation. 
The results of the firm satisfy the following equality in each period, namely 
where, 
N t = a vector of variable factors of production for the firm at time t. 
Wt = a vector of real factor prices at time t. 
D t = the real value of outstanding net debt for the firm at time t. 
Tt = the nominal interest rate paid at time t. 
Ttf = the expected inflation rate at time t. 
qt = the real effective price of capital goods at time t. 
T = the corporate income tax. 
(4) 
R(Kt, Nt,It) is the firm's revenue function (that is, it does not include investment expenditures), 
which depends on Kt, Nt and It. 
(5) 
8The discount factor in a given period is the rate which the investors (shareholders) apply to their expected 
equity return. 
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where F(Kt, Nt) is the production function, which is assumed to be a concave and homogeneous 
function of degree one in K and N. W(I, K) is a function of quadratic adjustment costs of the 
investment, defined in terms of output loss (so that net output is given by Y = F - G). We 
assume increasing and convex adjustment costs, that is, the faster the rate of gross investment, 
the greater the productivity lost to devoting resources to the installation of new capital goods. 
Finally, WtNt, is the nominal cost of the variable inputs (lab or costs plus cost of intermediate 
inputs ). 
We impose the transversality condition which prevents the firm from borrowing an infinite 
amount, 
[
T-l 1 lim IT {3j Dt = 0, Vt. 
T ..... oo . 0 
J= 
(6) 
Let At be the series of Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint (2). Substituting (4) 
into (2) and using the capital stock accounting identity (3), the first-order conditions for the 
capital stock (Kt) and the stock of net external debt (D t) for the firm can be calculated as 
(7) 
(8) 
Equation (7) shows that the current value of an investment unit must be equal to expected 
profits for each firm. Equation (8) equates the appropriately discounted marginal internal re-
sources over time. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and perfect capital markets, the 
after- tax return on debt must equal the required return on internal resources of the equity of 
the firm. Note that this condition implies an indeterminate capital structure. 
If the generated resources are strictly positive, then At = At+l = 0, and the intertemporal 
rate of discount of each firm would be equal to the inverse of effective interest rate on debt. On 
the other hand, if the non-negativity constraint on generated resources is not binding today, but 
is expected to bind tomorrow, the firm can save, thereby transferring current resources to the 
next period, where they are more needed, and At = EtAt+l ¥ 0. 
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So, in order to estimate the equation under the assumption of perfect capital markets, we 
assume that either the generated resources constraints (/ Rt ) is verified with strict inequality 
being f3t the inverse of the effective interest rate, or we suppose that the conditional covariance 
between the shadow cost associate with such restriction ().t+1) and the variable in t + 1 is 
constant. In either event, the following rule of optimum investment is obtained: 
1 + (1 _ ~)Tt _ 7r~ Et [(~1++).~:)) (1 - 8) ((1 - r)( -Pt+I)'lj;I(Kt, It) - qt+d] 
o. (9) 
2.2 A Model with financial constraints 
In order to analyze how the standard neoclassical investment model would be modified in the 
presence of financial constraints, we add an additional constraint to the initial problem, namely 
(10) 
where D; is the exogenously given maximum amount of outstanding debt set for the firm at 
time t. This additional constraint has been used by some authors, such as Whited (1992) 9. We 
assume that the firm takes that the lending sector determines its level each period according to 
an assessment of the firm's ability to repay. This series of exogenous constraints implies that 
the firm cannot affect its credit limit. 
Let 0t be the multiplier associated with constraint (10). The new first order condition for 
the stock of net external debt analogous to (8), for each firm results: 
o. (11 ) 
where either 0t = 0 or Dt = D; (or both). 
To understand the effect of the financial constraint on the allocation of investment, substi-
tuting (11) into (7), the first order conditions for the capital stock (Kt), one obtains, 
f3t 
9Following Whited (1992), we assume that the firm takes D~ as given, and that the lending sector determines 
its level each period, according to an assessment of the firm's ability to repay. 
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Compared to an unconstrained firm, a firm facing a binding liquidity constraint, a < 0, 
incurs a higher marginal opportunity cost of in vestmen t today, versus delaying it until tomorrow. 
That is, the value of revenues from an extra unit of investment is forced to be higher today than 
tomorrow in the face of a binding constraint. It also suggests, all else being equal, that the ftrm 
will intertemporally substitute investment tomorrow for investment today. 
3 Issues for econometric estimation 
To estimate equations (9) and (12) we substitute the functional forms for the revenue func-
tion F( ) and the adjustment cost 'IT(). F() is a homogeneous function of degree one and 
W( ) is positive and convex in the gross investment. The traditional literature on Tobin's q and 
investment, Summers (1981) and Hayashi (1982), assumes that adjustment costs are linearly ho-
mogeneous in investment and capital, so that marginal and average "q" are equal. A convenient 
parameterization that adheres to these constraints is, 
7f;(ft, Kt) = ~ [ (~ ) t - v] 2 Kt, (13) 
where v can be interpreted as a "normal rate of investment". Substituting the parameteri-
zation above and substituting expectations by realizations plus an expectational error, yields 
the following neoclassical investment model under perfect capital markets (see Appendix II for 
details) 10 
1 [(1 _ T)(l _ b)b (( I.) - v) + qHI (1 - b)] 
1 + (1 - T)rt I~ HI PHI 
+~ [(~~) - b(v + 1) (~.) + b (~.)2 + Vb]-~ = et+I, 
Pt+I 1~ t 1~ t 1~ t PHI 
(14) 
where (~{) t is the ratio of real cash flow to the capital stock and (k) t the ratio of investment 
to capital stock. On the other hand, we have replaced the expectation operator with a white 
lOFor the estimate 7r~ = 0 although we have considered .J?L., the price of the output in two consecutive periods. 
Pt+l 
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The model is nonlinear in both the parameters and in the ratio of investment to capital. 
This requires estimation by the Generalized Method of Moments or GMM ( Hansen (1982)). 
Rational expectations imply that the error in (14) should be orthogonal to any additional in-
formation known at time t. Therefore, any time t variable that is correlated with the variables 
in the regression will qualify as a valid instrument. If the error term is not orthogonal to the 
instruments, it should be rejected. The exact set of instrumental variables used is discussed 
below and shown in the tables which present our estimation results. 
When the firm has market power in the goods market and assuming constant price elasticity 
of demand (with 1(1 < 00 and ( > 1, both the marginal productivity and the marginal adjustment 
cost are multiplied by the term (1 - ~). One benefit of this specification is that it provides us 
with an estimated markup parameter that can be used to assess the model. 
The model without financial constraints, and under the hypothesis of imperfect competition 
in the goods market, takes the following formll : 
1 + (/_ r)rt [(1- r)(l- b)b(l-~) (( I,) - v) + qHl (1- 6)] + ~(1-~) ( 11. t+l PH! Pt+l ( 
[_( (C:) __ 1 (Y,) _ b(v + 1) (I,) + b (I,)2 + Vb] ( - 1 !I. t ( - 1 !I. t !I. t 11. t (15) 
This equation appears amplified with respect to equation (14) by the term (f)t' that is, 
the ratio of output to capital, and by the price elasticity of demand, E. 
Both investment equations are obtained under the hypothesis of perfect capital markets, that 
is to say, the non-negativity constraint on generated resources is not binding for two consecutive 
periods, or the shadow cost is no higher today than it is expected to be tomorrow (At =1= EtAt+l)' 
The alternative model estimated to test for the existence of financial constraints (equation 
12), is as follows: 
1 - At [ 1 (( I ) ) qHl ] Pt 1 (1 - r)(l - b)b(1 - -) -:; - v + -(1 - 6) + -(1 - -) 
1 + (1 - r)rt ( !I. HI Pt+l PHI ( 
PH! 
(16) 
11 See Appendix II 
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Here, we have re-normalized the relative shadow cost by defining the term, 
( 17) 
In the absence of any constraints on outside finance, this variable should equal zero. 
One requirement for estimating (16) is a specification for the term At. Under the hypothesis 
of perfect capital markets, At = 0, given that At = At+l = 0, or if A ::p ° it is expected that 
At < EtAt+1' or that the conditional variance of shadow cost associated with such restriction 
(At+I) and the variables in t + 1 is constant. However, under the alternative model with capital-
market frictions, At is not restricted to zero, and the null hypothesis would have to be rejected. 
The degree to which the debt constraint binds depends on the firm's desired level of borrowing 
relative to its exogenous debt limit, D;. Since equation (11) implies that, ceteris paribus, a 
change in at, will affect At, the latter will be a complicated function of the Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the constraint that D t ~ D;, and, therefore, a function of the determinants of 
the demand for borrowing, as well as of the debt limit. 
Finally, each model is estimated depending on whether the constraints on outside finance bind 
or not. First, we split the sample into two groups, namely those that are, a priori, constrained 
and those that are not, using, as a criterion the relations that exist between a credit entity and 
the firm. "Ve test the hypothesis that the investment behavior of the firm with a credit entity 
in its shareholding body will be closer to optimum, because such an entity exercises a certain 
control. This control is measured by the percentage of shares that the credit entity possesses 
in the firm. If the lender knows the characteristics of the structure of the firm, as well as the 
inherent risk of the investment project in which it is participating, the asymmetrical information 
problem will reduce and the firm will be able to have access to the quantity of debt that needs 
in order to optimize its investment decisions. 
We use the full sample and the two subsamples to estimate the model in (14), when the multi-
plier, At, is constrained to equal to zero. To estimate the unconstrained model, we parameterize, 
At as a function of observable variables. 
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4 The data 
The main data set is the database of the CNMV (Comisi6n N acional del Mercado de Valores )12. 
The CNMV base has surveyed the end-of-year balance sheet and other complementary infor-
mation of Spanish firms since 1990 on a year-by-year basis. The samples used in our paper are 
quoted manufacturing firms, with the financial and service sector firms having been suppressed 
from the initial sample. 
The final data set is a balanced panel of 129 firms which reported complete information for 
four consecutive years between 1991 and 1994 (one year is lost after computation of the capital 
stock and in vestmen t ). 
The main problem in the construction of the data set from the raw data has been that 
of matching reported book values to their corresponding market values. In order to do this, 
several assumptions are required, particularly in the computation of the market value of the 
capital stock. The details of the construction of the data set are described in Appendix Ill. 
The capital stock is measured as the replacement cost of the book value of net capital stock 
using the perpetual inventory method (See Salinger and Summers (1983)). We have obtained 
an individual average depreciation rate for each firm, calculated as the rate between the average 
values of accounting depreciation and accumulated depreciation (amortization) for four years. 
The cash flow is calculated as the difference between the added value and the personnel 
expenses. The gross output, Yt, coincides with the added values, that is, the value of the pro-
duction less intermediate consumption. The price of the capital goods ( qt ) has been measured 
as the implicit deflator of the gross capital stock. The price of firm's output Pt is measured 
at sectorial level, taking industrial price indices (Source: INE, Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics) . 
As stated above, we have divided the sample into two sets of firms, those where a credit 
entity has more than 10 per cent of its shares, and the rest. The first subsample is made up 
of 35 firms. To this group of firms we have added 4 more firms where the credit entity is the 
second most important shareholder and its percentage is so relevant as to reach 80 percent of the 
12The Spanish Securities and Exchange Cornrnision (SEC) 
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principal shareholder. The total number of firms in this subsample is 39. The null hypothesis 
is that the neoclassical model should be verified for this group of firms and not for the rest (90 
firms). 
Summary statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1. The first column in the Table reports 
the mean and standard deviations for the full sample of 129 firms. The subsamples appear in 
the second and third columns. We can observe that the firms with a banking representation in 
the shareholding have a large debt ratio ( debt-asset ratio) and the interest rate calculated to 
replacement cost13 is smaller than the rest of the sample, in spite of its debt ratio being higher. 
The higher interest rate, together with the debt ratio of the rest of the sample, seems to indicate 
the possible presence of financial constraints. However, this affirmation cannot be made with 
a certain reliability due to the high values of the standard deviation, which indicate confidence 
intervals of the debt cost that are very similar in both subsamples. 
Comparing the mean value of the number of personnel reveals that there is a certain variation 
in the size of our sample firms. Although the study is carried out with large firms (all quoted), 
the size effect is apparently inversely related to the control of the credit entities. This is due to 
the fact that there is a dispersion of shareholders in the large firms and, therefore, the type of 
control is more diffuse. On the other hand, the characteristics of the sample prevent us from 
subdividing the sample between large and small firms, as has been done in other studies14 . 
4.1 Investment equation estimates 
The analysis we present is sequential. Our first step is to estimate equation (15), the baseline 
neoclassical investment model that assumes perfect capital markets. Under the assumption of 
no capital-market fictions, there are two structural parameters which can be recovered: b, the 
quadratic adjustment parameter, and E, the price elasticity of demand. The point estimates 
for these parameters, along with standard errors and the x-statistics computed to test the 
model's overidentifying restrictions, are shown in Table 2. This test indicates the probability 
that the orthogonality conditions of expectations error et + 1, are not rejected with the selected 
13See Appendix III 
14 See Estr ada and Valles. 
14 
instrumental set. Our list of instrumental variables includes twice and once-lagged values of 
each of the variables in the model. When we estimate the augmented model (with the At 
parameterization) the instrumental set is augmented with variables used to parameterize At. 
We do not introduce the variable (caSh .~ol) lagged in t - 1 and t - 2 because we assume that 
capl a 
the firms face particular types of financing constraints, which are related to firms' cash flow, so 
that the effective discount rate for one of these firms depends on its cash flow 15. To the extent 
that the marginal product of capital is mismeasured, variables such as "cash flow" are correlated 
with this measurement error, this is a proxy for managers' perceived profitability. 
The estimates based on the full sample (of 129 firms) are given in the first row. We have 
used the two-step and three step estimates for the full sample, as well as for each subsample. 
For the full sample of firms, the overidentifying restrictions are decisively rejected; the residuals 
from the equation are strongly correlated with at least some of our instruments, which are listed 
at the bottom of the table. 
Having demonstrated that the standard model is rejected for the full sample, we next inves-
tigate \vhether this rejection is related to the initial hypothesis that those firms whose sharehol-
ders include a credit entity with a significant stake will not have their debt restricted (therefore, 
At = 0). 
The next two rows present the results when the model is reestimated separately for both 
subsamples. The model operates quite well for those subsamples with banking participation. In 
particular, the overidentifying restrictions are rejected for those firms which have no relevant 
banking participation amongst their shareholders and not rejected for the rest of the firms. If the 
significance of the parameters is analyzed in the model (b and E), solely in the first subsample, 
that is, for firms with a banking participation in their shareholding, neither model is rejected, 
while in the full sample and in the rest of the sample only the elasticity of demand, E, is accepted. 
With respect to the values of elasticity of demand, a high magnitude of the coefficient of elasticity 
can be observed, which indicates a low market power. In relation to other studies, the more 
plausible value corresponds to the first subsample; here, the market value implies a mark-up, 
that is, U), close to 20 percent16 , in agreement with the findings of Mazon (1992). 
15See Hubbard et al. (1995). 
16The estimate value of [ is identified in this case because these are constant returns to scale. 
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On the other hand, the adjustment cost estimated are only significant for the subsample 
that verifies the neoclassical model; for the rest they are not significant. This parameter is 
higher than the estimates of Estrada and Valles (1995) for the Spanish economy, but it does 
not reach those calculated by Whited (1992) and Hubbard et al. (1995). To understand the 
economic significance of this parameter, the adjustment cost function is valued at the average 
value of the sample. That is, under the assumption that v = 0, and the ratio k = 0.1, a firm 
with a capital stock of 500 million dollars which invests 50 million dollars, the value of b in 
the sample without financial constraints and with a credit entity equals 0.9827. This implies 
that adjustment costs will be 2.45 million, or about 5 percent of investment expenditure. These 
values are lower than those estimated by Whited (1992) which were about 10 percent, but they 
coincide with the estimates for the Spanish economy in a "q-model" for Spanish industrial firms, 
that vary between 2 and 6 percent (Alonso-Borrego and Bentolila (1994)). 
\Ve have not detected important variations between the two-step and three-step estimates, 
with the latter being the most efficient. 
4.2 Specification of financial constraints 
The second objective of this article is to give a specification to At, the multiplier that arises 
as a result of financing constraints. Two different specifications have been tried. Our simplest 
specification allows the extent to which this constraint binds to depend on the firm's cash 
position. There are several studies that try a similar approach, including those of Hubbard et 
al. (1992), Whited (1992) and Himmerberg (1991). The first employs the following specification. 
(CF) At = {La + {L1 J( t' (18) 
where {L1 measures the change in the firm's effective discount factor that occurs as a result 
of an increase in internal funds, holding investment opportunities constant. One would expect 
that {L1 < 0, that is, increases in internal funds, ceteris paribus, relax the constraint on external 
finance 17. 
17The same justification is provided by the reduced-form test, which includes measures of internal funds in 
regressions of the Tobin's q model. 
16 
The results from estimating this augmented model are shown in the first column of Table 
3. We reestimate the model for the second sUbsample of non-affiliated firms. We can note 
that, in both cases, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected, with the neoclassical model, 
therefore, being verified. As expected J.L1 parameters estimates are negative, that is to say, 
increasing the internal funds reduces the shadow cost of the constraint; in other words, the 
constraint is relaxed. Similarly we can observe a decrease in the adjustment cost parameter (b). 
The values obtained are superior to those of the first subsample (bank-affiliated), shown in Table 
2, and they are the equivalent of about 8 percent of investment expenditure, three percentage 
points above the previous figure. When analyzing the impact of the cash flow on the discount 
factor, we find that, if the (CC~~i~~l) ratio decreases by 20 percent (from 0.15 to 0.12), this 
would lower the discount factor by just over 0.0078 (0.26 x 0.03). On the other hand, we can 
observe a market power similar to the firms of the first subsample (bank-affiliated) (19%). 
The second parameterization follows Whited (1991) who parameterized At as a function 
of contemporaneous variables which indicate the firm's financial health, using variables that 
measure the firm's lack of collateral and the likelihood of financial distress. Specifically, he used 
the ratio of the market value of the firm's debt to the market value of its total assets and the 
ratio of the firm's interest expense to the sum of interest expense plus cash flow, 
* (DR) (GF) At = Wo + W1 AR t + W2 G F + eFt' 
where, 
(~) = Debt to replacement cost / assets to replacement value. 
(cf:GF) t = Interest expense / (interest expense plus cash flow )18. 
(19) 
The estimated coefficients of equation (19) appear in the second column of Table 3. First, 
note that the overidentifying restrictions are rejected, thus the parameters which define the 
shadow cost At are not significant. We find that the ratios of collateral and covering are not 
relevant for relaxing the financial constraints. Although, a priori, W1 and W2 have to be positive, 
it is solely the second which is positive, but none of the parameters are significant and the overi-
dentifying restrictions are rejected. The b value is 0.87, equivalent to 4.35 percent of investment 
expenditure, and the elasticity is 8.36%, indicating a market power of 11 %. The results of three 
18Covering ratio 
17 
-step estimator appear in Table 4. Note that the model continues to be rejected, and that even 
the p-value of the overidentifying restriction is smaller. Therefore only cash flow seems to have 
a significant effect on investment behavior. This may be so because other financial variables are 
somehow already taken into account. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have presented evidence of the fact that firms with a close relationship to a 
bank -those firms where a bank exercises a control over its shareholding- are nearer to optimum 
investment than firms which do not have this relationship. If the banks are relevant shareholders, 
then the limits to the borrowing capacity of the firms are relaxed or disappear, verifying the 
neoclassical investment model. 
This evidence lends some support to the hypothesis that information problems, such as moral 
hazard, can be attenuated when there is a mechanism of control and monitoring by the lender, 
for example, shareholding control of the firm. 
To test this hypothesis, we have estimated a neoclassical investment model without financial 
constraints and we have demonstrated that this model is only verified when there is a close 
relationship with a bank. For the rest of the sample the extended neoclassical model with 
financial constraints is verified. However, in our sample, lack of collateral and financial health 
do not affect the financial constraints in that both models, the neoclassical and the alternative, 
are rejected. 
Some relevant questions remain open. Firstly, other variables may affect investment behavior, 
but econometric techniques limit the number of sub-samples that can be constructed. Firm 
size, for instance, could be positively correlated with bank affiliation and in this case, size 
itself may be responsible for relaxing financial constraints because they signal the severity of 
informational asymmetry faced by a firm. Size may also proxy for the magnitude of transaction 
costs encountered when accessing external sources of finance. Secondly, the analysis performed 
in this paper as well as in the rest of the relevant literature, does not test for causality. It 
is unclear if bank affiliated firms behave according to the neoclassical model because of bank 
18 
control and monitoring, as theory suggest, or if banks choose non financially constrained firms 
in the first place. At least two directions for future research appear promising. The first is to 
identify the precise mechanism by which banks may be able to relax constraints. The second 
is to consider other types of financial constraints. We have considered a constraint over the 
maximum amount of outstanding debt, and other possible kinds of constraints may be relevant. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX I Derivation of the Euler equation for investment 
Each firm maximizes the present value of the current and future internal resources (IRit), 
s. a. (A.1) 
The firm faces the capital accumulation constraint, 
(A.2) 
Wi th the internal resources (I RH2 ) being 
Let )..t be the series of Lagrange multipliers associated with the nonnegativity constraint. 
The Bellman equation for the firm is as follows, 
V(J(t) = E; {(1 + )..t) [(R(J(t, Nt,!t) - rtDt-l )(1 - T) 
+ D t - (1 - r.nD t- 1 - qtItl + V(J(t(1 - 8) + IHd 
The first order conditions are the following, 
It: 
(1 + )..t) [(1- T) (Z:: + ~~tt) - qt] + Et [!3t 8~~1] = 0 
That is, 








Multiplying (A.5) (the first order condition) by (1- 8), subtracting (A.7) and operating with 
(A.6), 
Et/3it [(\~~:1 ((1- T)( -Pt+l III [(Kt,It)(l - 8)) - qt+l (1 - 8))] = 
Pt (FK(Kt, Nt ) - IlIK(Kt , It) - III [(Kt, It)) - qt 
to derive the neoclassical model, At = EtAt+l, that is, 
1 ~t = --~--~-----




Appendix 11 Econometric Specifications 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, the conditional expectation can be substituted 
by the observed value, including an expectational error term, (eH1)' 
(A.10) 
As <I>I(J(H1,It+1) = b ((k)t+1 - V), with b being the adjustment cost parameter, we have 
that, 
(A.11) 
Substituting (A.11) in (A.10), the neoclassical investment model is, 
(A.12) 
Relaxing perfect competition 
Assuming constant price elasticity of demand E, with \E\ < 00, the output price is p(l-l/E) 
instead of Pt. Hence, 
Pt (1 - 1) (1'.) - Wt!"t + Pt b ( I.) 2 ( J\ t J\ t J\ 
-b(v + l)pt(1- ~) (f)t + ptbv(l- ~) 
Pt (Cf) - 1pt (r.) + pt b(l- 1) (-L.)2 I\t (J\t (J\ 
-b( V + l)pt(1- ~ ) (f) t + Pt(1 - ~ )bv 
The neoclassical model we obtain is the following, 
H(l-T)lrt+l-7rf [(1- r)(l- 8)b(1-~) ((f )t+1 - v) + ~:+~ (1- 8)] 




APPENDIX III Construction of the data set 
The final sample consists of a balanced panel of 129 manufacturing firms and 5 years of data, 
reported to the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (SSEC) from 1990 to 1994. 
To obtain this final sample, the following filters have been applied: 
1. Accounting equity must be positive. 
2. Book value of the interest expense must be positive. 
3. The investment rate -k for two consecutive periods has to be less than 2 (In the contrary 
case, we consider that two firms have merged). 
4. Book value of the Debt must be positive. 
5. Book value of the total capital stock must be positive. 
6. Sales and gross output must be positive. 
7. Labor costs must be positive. 
Variable construction 
1. Debt to replacement value (Fazzari et al. (1988), Hernando and Valles (1991) 
Short-term Debt = Book value / Long-term Debt = Book value x (it:;'t) m, 
with: 
m = average maturities of long-term debt = 3 years 
GF 
Tit = =D-c-+--=D--:-l 
Tit = interest rate of new operations on long-term bank loans (three or more years) 
GF t = Interest expense 
2. Cost of Debt = Interest expense / Debt to replacement value 
23 
3. Capital stock and Investment 
Since the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission does not have any independent 
estimates of investment available, the gross nominal investment It must be imputed from 
changes in the book value of capital with a correction for depreciation, that is, 
It = [(NEt - [(NEt- 1 + Dept 
where, [(NEt is the book value of the net capital stock, [(NEt = [(GEt - ADept, [(GEt 
is the book value of the gross capital stock; ADept is the accumulated depreciation of the 
capital stock; Dept is the accounting depreciation during the year. 
To calculate the market value (replacement value) of these two assets, we employ a per-
petual inventory method, 
[(t = It + ~ [(t-1(1 - 15) 
qt-1 
15 = ~ £: ~ept 
T t=l F.. GEt 
where Ti is the number of years of available data for firm i. The advantage ofthis measure is 
that it allows us to compute different depreciation rates for firms. The disadvantage is that 
the accounting depreciation rate can differ significantly from the economic depreciation 
rate, which is approximated. 
qt is the price of capital goods; we use the corresponding implicit deflator of investment 
(Source: Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE). 
The recursive method employed here can generate negative market values qtJ(t or market 
\"alues significantly above zero when the book value of the capital is zero. This fact is taken 
into account in order to eliminate firms with implausible values for the capital stock. 
4. The cash flow is calculated as net income plus depreciation and the gross output is calcu-
lated as total production value less net sales. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES FOR 190 SPANISH MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 
1990-1994 
Full Sample Subsample (1) Subsample (2) 
129 firms 39 firms 90 firms 
(tL mean 
standard deviation 






























































Subsample (1) is where a credit entity has more than 10 per cent of its shares. Subsample (2) is the rest of the 
firms. 
(t) t = Investment / Replacement value of capital stock. 
(~{L = Operating income plus depreciation charges / Replacement value of last year's capital stock. 
(~) t = Market value of debt / Replacement value of assets. 
Tt = Interest rate calculated at replacement cost. 
(f) t = Output / Replacement value of capital stock. 
dept = Depreciation measured as (accounting depreciation during the year / accumulated depreciation of the 
capital stock). 
N t = Number of personnel. 
28 
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE NEOCLASSICAL INVESTMENT MODEL 
(1991-1994) 
The estimated parameters are b, the adjustment cost parameter and f, elasticity of demand. The Euler equation takes 
the following form: 
(15) 
Adjustment Cost Elasticity of Test of Overidentifying 
parameter demand Restrictions 
b 2 X16 
(1) 0.1412 15.082- 34.1426 
Full sample (0.2436) (0.404) (0.025) 
129 firms (2) 0.1558 14.005- 36.58 
(0.1620) (0.3702) (0.013) 
(1) 0.9827- 4,330- 26.9292 
Bank-affiliated (0.118) (0.0359) (0.13726) 
39 firms (2) 0.9485- 4.4014 - 26.8154 
(0.1162) (0.0358) (0.1405) 
(1 ) 0.0995 46.72- 35.75 
non bank-affiliated (0.5797) (0.7751) (0.016) 
90 firms (2) 0.0963 47.07- 35.81 
(0.5612) (0.7814) (0.016) 
(1) is the two-step estimator and (2) is the three-step estimator. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The estimates have been calculated using GMM and levels. Significant coefficients 
at the 5 percent confidence level are indicated with one asterisk. Significance levels to test for overidentifying restrictions 
are shown in parentheses beneath the test statistic (p-value). 
Th . d' h . . . I d I (I) 2 r Y !l...1!.L d DR Id' d . emstrumentssetuse mt eestlmatlOnmcuesT\' T\ 'T\'T\'P'p'_l,an AR' agge mt-lan mt-2. 
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TABLE 3 
NEOCLASSICAL INVESTMENT MODEL AUGMENTED FOR FIRMS WITHOUT RELEVANT BANKING 
CONTROL Subs ample 2, (90 firms) 
1991-1994 Period 
The estimate parameters are b the adjustment cost parameter and ( elasticity of demand of equation (16) and /1-0 and 
/1-1 if At is parameterized as expression (18), and wo. Wl and W2 if it is parameterize as (19). The Euler equation takes the 
following form 
I-A" [(1- T)(l- 8)b(1 - 1) ((.l.,). - 8) + ~(1- 8)] + ...EiL(1- 1) l+(l-T)',. < 1, ,t+l P"+' P"+' < 
[<~1 (~[t- <:1 O~t-b(8+1)(tL+b(t)~t+8b] -~ = eit+l· (16) 
being Ait /1-0 + /1-1 (Cil t in (1) and Ait = wo + Wl (~)it +W2 (GFG:CF)it' in (2) 
(1) (2) 
Adjustment cost 1. 7308' 0.8738' 
b (0.3627) (0.2936) 
Elasticity 5.3392' 8.368 ' 
( (0.3200) (0.314) 
shadow cost Ait -0.14795' 
Parameter !lO (0.0557) 
shadow cost Ait -0.26173' 
parameter !ll (0.0466) 
shadow cost Art -0.3044 
parameter wO (0.0965) 
shadow cost Art -0.0037 
parmneter wl (0.005) 
shadow cost Art 0.2842 
parameter w2 (1.295) 
Test of Overidentifying 25.8587 32.122 
• 2 (0.1030) (0.0420) XIS 
(1) is the two-step estimator and equation (15). (2) is the two-step estimator and equation (17). The three-step 
estimator appear in Table 4. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The estimates have been calculated 
using GMM and levels. Significant coefficients at the 5 percent confidence level are indicated with one asterisk. 
Significance levels for the test of overidentifying restrictions are shown in parentheses beneath the test statistic 
(p-value). 
Th . d . . . . I d I (1)2, Y 9. --1!L DR I d d e lllstruments set use m estimatIOn mc u es K' K 'K' K' P' Pt-I' and AR' agge in t -1 an in t - 2. 
In column (2) the instruments set is augmented with (GFG:C F) 
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TABLE 4 
NEOCLASSICAL INVESTMENT MODEL AUGMENTED FOR FIRMS WITHOUT RELEVANT BANKING 
CONTROL Subsample 2, (90 firms) 
1991-1994 Period 
The estimate parameters are b the adjustment cost parameter and ( elasticity of demand of equation (16) and /10 and 
/11 if Ait is parameterized as expression (18), and "-'0, WI and W2 if it is parameterize as (19). The Euler equation takes the 
following form 
I-A" [(1- T)(l- 6)b(1 - 1) ((L) - 6) + .!!.!.±!..(1 - 6)] + ....E..!..L(1 _ 1) I+(I-r)r., < K it+1 P,'+l P"+l < 
[ _< (CF) __ I (X-) _ b(6 + 1) (L) + b (L)2 + 6b]-~ - e· e--l ]( it co-l /{ it 1{ it I{ tt Pit+l - tt+l· 
(16) 
being Ait = /10 + /11 (~f Lt in (1) and Ait = wo + WI (~) it + W2 (GFG:C F) it in (2). 
(1) (2) 
Adjustment cost 1.2202' 0.7436' 
b (0.4089) (0.3137) 
Elasticity 9.6432' 11.11' 
(0.3200) (0.351) 
shadow cost Ait -0.0292' 
Parameter ILO (0.045) 
shadow cost Ait -0.2735' 
parameter ILl (0.0513) 
shadow cost Ait -0.0676 
parameter wO (0.0702) 
shadow cost Ait -0.0052 
parameter wI (0.004) 
shadow cost Ait 0.1995 
parameter w2 (0.150) 
Test of Overidentifying 24.183 36.931 
2 
Xl8 (0.1491) (0.0134) 
(1) is the three-step estimator and equation (15). (2) is the three-step estimator and equation (17). Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. The estimates have been calculated using GMM and levels. Significant coefficients 
at the 5 percent level are indicated with one asterisk. Significance levels for the test of overidentifying restrictions 
are shown in parentheses beneath the test statistic (p-value). 
The instruments set used in estimation includes t, (t)2,t, *', ~, ~, and ~~, lagged in t -1 and in t - 2. 
In column (2) the instruments set is augmented with (GFG:C F) 
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